Autism Blog

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My aim in this paper is to present reasons for adopting a focus on the development of self/other-awareness when characterizing the developmental psychopathology of autism. The strengths of such a position include an emphasis on children’s emotional relations with embodied persons as foundational for their growing understanding of minds. I give special attention to the process of identifying with the attitudes of others, and experience of other-person-centred emotions, for the development of communication and thinking. The study of limitations in these aspects of self-other relatedness among individuals with autism is pivotal for understanding the pathogenesis of the syndrome.

This article describes a parallel and distributed processing model (PDPM) of joint attention, self-referenced processing and autism. According to this model, autism involves early impairments in the capacity for rapid, integrated processing of self-referenced (proprioceptive and interoceptive) and other-referenced (exteroceptive) information. Measures of joint attention have proven useful in research on autism because they are sensitive to the early development of the ‘parallel’ and integrated processing of self- and other-referenced stimuli. Moreover, joint attention behaviors are a consequence, but also an organizer of the functional development of a distal distributed cortical system involving anterior networks including the prefrontal and insula cortices, as well as posterior neural networks including the temporal and parietal cortices. Measures of joint attention provide early behavioral indicators of atypical development in this parallel and distributed processing system in autism. In addition it is proposed that an early, chronic disturbance in the capacity for integrating self- and other-referenced information may have cascading effects on the development of self awareness in autism. The assumptions, empirical support and future research implications of this model are discussed.

This article reviews research on (a) autobiographical episodic and semantic memory, (b) the self-reference effect, (c) memory for the actions of self versus other (the self-enactment effect), and (d) non-autobiographical episodic memory in autism spectrum disorder (ASD), and provides a theoretical framework to account for the bidirectional relationship between memory and the self in ASD. It is argued that individuals with ASD have diminished psychological self-knowledge (as a consequence of diagnostic social and communication impairments), alongside intact physical self-knowledge, resulting in an under-elaborated self-concept. Consequently, individuals with ASD show impaired autobiographical episodic memory and a reduced self-reference effect (which may each rely on psychological aspects of the self-concept) but do not show specific impairments in memory for their own rather than others’ actions (which may rely on physical aspects of the self-concept). However, it is also argued that memory impairments in ASD (e.g., in non-autobiographical episodic memory) may not be entirely accounted for in terms of self-related processes. Other factors, such as deficits in memory binding, may also play a role. Finally, it is argued that deficits in autobiographical episodic memory and future thinking may result in a diminished temporally extended self-concept in ASD.

The self-presentation skills of children and adolescents with high-functioning autistic spectrum disorder (HFASD) and typically developing (TD) controls were compared, in response to both hypothetical and real life situations. In both situations, 26 HFASD and 26 TD participants were prompted to describe themselves twice, first in a baseline condition, and later in a goal-directed condition where specific information was given about the preferences and demands of the audience. Confirming and extending previous research, both TD and HFASD participants exhibited a tendency to be more positive when describing themselves in a goal-directed condition. However, HFASD participants were less strategic than TD participants in responding to the information they were given about the audience preferences and demands. Possible explanations and implications of the results are discussed.

Assuming that self-awareness is not a unitary phenomenon, and that one can be aware of different aspects of self at any one time, it follows that selective impairments in self-awareness can occur. This article explores the idea that autism involves a particular deficit in awareness of the ‘psychological self’, or ‘theory of own mind’. This hypothesised deficit renders individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) at least as impaired at recognising their own mental states as at recognising mental states in other people. This deficit, it is argued, stands in contrast to an apparently typical awareness of the ‘physical self’ amongst people with autism. Theoretical implications of the empirical evidence are discussed.

Two studies are reported which investigate delayed video self-recognition (DSR) in children with autistic disorder and Asperger’s disorder relative to one another and to their typically developing peers. A secondary aim was to establish whether DSR ability is dependent on metarepresentational ability. Children’s verbal and affective responses to their image were also measured. Three groups of male children between 5 and 9 years, comprising 15 with high-functioning autistic disorder (HFA), 12 with Asperger’s disorder (AspD), and 15 typically developing (TD) children, participated in Study 1. Study 2 included two groups of younger children (18 HFA; 18 TD) aged 4 to 7 years. Participant groups in each study were equally able to recognize themselves using delayed video feedback, and responded to their marked image with positive affect. This was so even amongst children with HFA who were impaired in their performance on false belief tasks, casting doubt on a metarepresentational basis of DSR.

Previous research has demonstrated that adults with high functioning autism (HFA)/Asperger syndrome (AS) judge others as having as much knowledge about their inner mental states as they do. The current study examined whether this pattern also applies to adolescents with HFA/AS because typically developing adolescents, in contrast to younger children, regard themselves as experts on their own inner states. Twenty-two adolescents with HFA/AS and 22 controls judged how much they versus a comparison person knew about 6 aspects of their inner states. In contrast to typically developing adolescents, those with HFA/AS judged the comparison person as having more knowledge about themselves than they did. This study suggests that adolescents with HFA/AS have more pronounced difficulties with this aspect of self-knowledge than do adults with this condition. The implications of this deficit for social functioning are discussed.

This study aimed to extend Lee and Hobson’s (1998) findings regarding self-conceptualisation in autism by using a more verbally able sample. The study also investigated the ability to conceptualise self through other. Sixteen typically developing and sixteen adolescents with ASD matched for chronological and verbal mental age were administered a modified version of Damon and Hart’s (1988) self-as-subject interview, which also required participants to conceptualise themselves from another’s perspective. Self-conceptualisation ability was similar between groups across the categories of distinctiveness and continuity, but reduced in the ASD group under the category of agency. Participants with ASD were, however, less able to conceptualise themselves from another’s perspective. These results are discussed in relation to second-person processes and narrative abilities.

Children with autism achieve mirror self-recognition appropriate to developmental age, but are nonetheless reported to have problems in other aspects of a sense of self. We observed behaviour in the mirror in 12 pre-school children with autism, 13 pre-school children with Down syndrome (DS) and 13 typically developing (TD) toddlers. Reliable differences in reflecting actions, social relatedness and positive affect towards themselves, and an absence of coy smiles differentiated the children with autism from the others. The children with DS showed the highest interest in their own faces. These differences were largely independent of mirror self-recognition (MSR), broadly supporting arguments for dissociation between interpersonal and conceptual aspects of self. Mirror behaviour may be a subtle but easily elicited measure of the social quality of a sense of self.